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i develop an account of ordinary physical causation as productive, causally closed, and 
operating via mechanisms. This picture entails rejection of Baker’s claims that intention-
dependent properties are independently causally efficacious and share the lower-level physical 
causal nexus. however, i suggest that Baker’s constitution account has the resources to 
overcome these difficulties, and that intention-dependent causal relations are constituted by 
lower-level ones.
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In the final chapter of naturalism and the first-Person Perspective (baker 2013, pp. 
207-234), lynne rudder baker builds upon the causal arguments developed in her 
earlier work (e.g., baker 2000, 2007) as part of her constitution account of reality. in 
that account, baker distinguishes those objects and properties that are intention-
dependent (id) from other, lower-level, non-id objects and properties. id properties 
are either propositional attitude properties – believing, etc. – or properties whose 
instances presuppose that there are entities that are bearers of propositional 
attitudes (baker 2007, pp. 11-13), such as the property of being an economic 
recession. id objects are either such entities (i.e., persons) or objects, like houses or 
computers, whose existence presupposes the existence of the former. id objects 
and properties are constituted, in favourable circumstances, by the lower-level, 
non-id ones. however, baker (2013, p. 217) also contends that, like all properties and 
property-instances, mental and other id properties are nevertheless physical.
it is central to baker’s anti-reductive causal arguments that id causal property-
instances are real and capable of independently causally affecting the objects and 
properties of the non-id, physical world. thus she claims that there is downward 
causation, whereby mental contents have physical effects, and she presents 
empirical data which she believes support this claim (baker 2013, pp. 220-233). 
baker’s theoretical argument for downward causation is based on two claims that 
are, I argue, false and in any case mutually incompatible; firstly, that the causal 
powers of id property-instances are independent of those of their constituting 
property-instances (baker 2013, pp. 216), and secondly, that id and lower-level 
causes, both being physical property-instances, belong in a single causal nexus, 
allowing inter-level causation (ivi, pp. 217; 231-233).
Further, i will argue that on an account, which i will develop, of causal relations 
amongst the objects that make up the furniture of the everyday world, the idea 
that mental content, qua content, has effects in the physical world is incoherent. 
nevertheless, i will claim, baker’s constitution account itself contains the resources 
to provide a robust and satisfying account of mental causation.
Clarification of my proposals requires a brief review of the relevant aspects 
of baker’s constitution account. constitution, according to baker, is a 
relation of unity without identity, a category that lies between identity and 
separate existence without being either. the constitution account, which 
presupposes that reality contains multiple hierarchical ontological levels 
or layers, is developed most fully in baker (2007) as the basis of a defense of 
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the reality of everyday objects and properties and their causal powers. here 
i discuss only property constitution, according to which an instancing of a 
lower-level property in an object constitutes, in the presence of favourable 
circumstances, an instancing of a higher-level, for example id, property 
in that object. this higher property-instance acquires, in virtue of its 
constitution in the favourable circumstances, novel and irreducible causal 
powers not possessed by its constituting property-instance alone.
Favourable circumstances, in baker’s technical sense (baker 2007, pp. 160-
161), are extrinsic or relational properties that must be instantiated if the 
constituting property is to constitute the higher property in question. 
so, to introduce one of baker’s examples, an instance of hand-raising, in 
favourable circumstances, constitutes an instance of voting. in this case, the 
favourable circumstances comprise the hand-raising’s being deliberately 
performed as a voting, by a competent person, in an environment in which 
there is agreement, within a suitable background cultural milieu, that a 
ballot is in progress in which hand-raising counts as voting. in different 
circumstances the same hand-raising might have constituted something 
else, say a call for attention, or nothing at all. crucially, baker insists also 
that the identity of the constituting thing is subsumed in the identity of 
what it constitutes. “as long as x constitutes y, y encompasses or subsumes 
x” (baker 2000, p. 33), so that “x has no independent existence” (ivi, p. 46). 
the hand-raising is the voting – the “is”, not of identity, composition, or 
predication, but of constitution.
baker’s claim that constituted property-instances, such as being a voting, 
are endowed with novel and irreducible causal powers is encapsulated in the 
Principle of Independent Causal Efficacy (ICE) (e.g., Baker 2013, pp. 216):
an irreducible higher-level property-instance (x’s having F at t) has 
independent causal efficacy if and only if
 (1) x’s having F at t has an effect e, and 
 (2) x’s having F at t would have had the effect e even if its     
 constituting property-instance had been different, and 
 (3) x’s having F at t confers causal powers that could not have      
 been conferred by its constituting property-instance alone.
baker (2007, pp. 115-116) offers an example in support of (ice): let 
v be Jones’s voting against smith at t 
P be Jones’s hand going up at t 
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v* be smith’s getting angry at Jones at t’ 
P* be smith’s neural state at t’ 
c be circumstances that obtain at t in which a vote is taken by raising 
hands 
suppose v is constituted by P and v* by P*.
in the example it is assumed as a premise that Jones’s voting causes smith’s 
anger. Baker’s (2007, pp. 106) justification of this assumption, on the grounds 
of the practical indispensability of such causal claims in everyday life, 
is a key motivating factor in her rejection of Jaegwon Kim’s arguments 
against non-reductive physicalism, and especially of his principle of causal/
explanatory exclusion (Kim 1993, pp. 250; 1998), which states that there is no 
more than one complete and independent cause (or causal explanation) of 
any event. if Kim’s arguments are accepted, baker points out (2007, pp. 106-
110), this would threaten not only the independent causal efficacy of mental 
content but also that of a huge range of non-mental id properties, such as 
being a driver’s licence or being a delegate, and for her this amounts to a 
reductio ad absurdum of Kim’s position.
baker claims that v’s causing v*, in the example, is independent of any 
lower-level causal relation, thus vindicating (ICE), since, first, V could have 
been constituted differently, for example if votes were cast electronically, 
and still have caused v*, and second, although the causal powers of P alone 
are purely lower-level, P’s constitution of v in favourable circumstances 
gives v the new power of causing smith’s anger.
the notion of cause that underpins baker’s claims here is a metaphysically 
undemanding one. essentially, on her view, wherever a causal explanation 
is available and a counterfactual dependence of an explanandum on an 
explanans can be shown, a cause is also to be found (baker 1993). i will now 
put forward an account of causal relations among the ordinary physical 
objects and substances that comprise our world that, i believe, calls baker’s 
account of id causation into question.
baker’s rejection of the principle of causal/explanatory exclusion (baker 
2007, pp. 99-102) trades on the possibility that a fundamental microphysical 
causal level – the level at which true causal relations must be located, 
according to the exclusion principle – may not exist. i will not try to 
counter this argument because, i contend, this hypothetical level is not 
the appropriate place in which to look when we are seeking a clarification 
of mental and id causation in the everyday world whose existence baker’s 
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We should look, rather, at causality as it concerns the ordinary objects, 
with their properties and relations, that make up the perceptible, non-
id macroscopic world in which we live, together with some of its well-
understood extensions into the microscopic. this is the world that 
corresponds to what sellars (1991, pp. 1-40) called the manifest image of 
man in the world. my claim is that no matter how problematic the notion 
of causation may be at a fundamental level, there exist objectively real 
causal relations among these observable physical entities, ‘objectively’ being 
understood in baker’s (1995, pp. 232-236) sense of recognition-independence, 
in that facts about these causal relations generally do or do not obtain 
independently of any individual’s or community’s beliefs about them.
Sellars himself opposes the scientific image to the manifest, and claims 
that the occupants of the former are the only true existents. but, as many 
have pointed out, this very claim, as well as all other claims, is made from 
the standpoint of the manifest image. baker’s argument for the reality of 
the world of macroscopic objects is based on practical necessity, her idea 
that “metaphysics should not swing free of the rest of human enquiry ... 
[it] ... should be responsive to reflection on successful cognitive practices, 
scientific and nonscientific” (Baker 2007, p. 15). Philosophers such as 
mcdowell (2000) and davidson (2001) further argue for a transcendental link 
between our very possession of the conceptual capacities we do and the 
existence of the world revealed to us through perception.
i would argue, then, that the manifest image is the natural home of our 
causal claims and beliefs about the world, and that it is within the manifest 
image that we should expect to locate the relevant distinctions among 
and constraints on those beliefs. We have, i suggest, a deep and intuitive 
understanding of what is and is not causally possible within the manifest 
world. We know, for example, that macroscopic objects cannot change their 
spatial location from a to b without passing through space between a and b. 
As de Muijnck puts it (2003, p. 46), if we cannot find any physical influences 
connecting alleged cause and effect, we would sooner suspect coincidence 
than “action at a distance” – that is, than some kind of magical cause-like 
process. i will use these notions to distinguish a basic category of causation 
within the manifest image that i call “manifest physical causation”. 
Further, i contend that our 21st century manifest image includes objects, 
properties, and relations belonging to the special physical sciences, as in the 
biochemical example in the next section. This claim is justified, I believe, 
because even though such things as genes and neurotransmitters are visible 
only by special techniques, not only are their existence and properties so 
well-established empirically as to be effectively beyond doubt, but they 
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clearly participate in the same causal nexus as more familiar, macroscopic 
entities.
ordinary causal-explanatory claims, descriptions, and explanations contain 
multiple instances of the use of “cause”, “because”, and their cognates 
which, when they cite causes and effects, move freely among mental, non-
mental id, and non-id items. in this everyday causal discourse we usually 
do not distinguish either between causation and causal explanation (beebee 
2004, p. 293), or among events, states, objects, facts, or negative facts, as 
causal relata. but when we unpack this causal discourse, i will argue, we can 
distinguish a more basic category of causal statement. causal claims that i 
categorize as manifest physical, like
a lightning strike caused the forest fire, or
local electrical depolarization of the axonal membrane causes opening of 
voltage-gated sodium ion channels
are distinguishable, i claim, from id and mixed id/physical causal claims 
such as
excessive sub-prime mortgage lending caused the recession,
he purposely threw the ball that smashed the window, or
human economic activity causes climate change
in a number of crucially important ways. it is important, moreover, to 
emphasise that our understanding of these differences is grounded in our 
intuitive grasp, based upon shared experience, of how things generally work 
in the non-intentional world around us.
Firstly, manifest physical causal statements are free of allusions to 
normativity or related properties that are connected with our interests, 
such as meaningfulness or goal-directedness. secondly, as remarks 
such as de muijnck’s, above, suggest, we have every reason to think that 
these causal relations form a single, closed causal nexus. my inclusion of 
an example from neurophysiology in the category of manifest physical 
causation is justified, I believe, because we cannot nowadays seriously doubt 
the existence of such entities as neurons or axons, or that their properties 
are components of a single shared causal nexus, even though they are 
not strictly part of the world of the manifest image in its pre-scientific 
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form. While it is true that our understanding of special physical sciences 
such as neurophysiology probably does not reflect the nature of reality 
as postulated by fundamental physics, nevertheless within the context of 
the manifest image, this understanding is homonomic, in davidson’s (1980, 
p. 219) sense, with our intuitive grasp of the workings of the macroscopic 
world. and this understanding, applied to, say the workings of mechanical, 
biological, or meteorological processes, includes the tacit conviction that 
they proceed entirely without any influence from outside the physical 
causal nexus. even when we consider human agency, whatever our view of 
mental causation, tyler burge is surely right that we do not think of mental 
causes “on a physical model – as providing an extra ‘bump’ on the effect” 
(burge 1993, p. 115).
on my account manifest physical causation is causation in a productive sense. 
thus when a manifest physical causal relation is instanced we understand 
that there must occur a transfer of energy of some kind – mechanical, 
electromagnetic, or chemical, say. This implies, firstly, that these causal 
relations are instantiated in virtue of intrinsic properties of the causes, and 
secondly, that an appropriate kind of spatio-temporal connection must exist 
between cause and effect (hall 2004). 
in contrast, the criteria by which we identify id or mixed id/physical causal 
relations are much less rigorous, being mainly based on the requirement that 
there be a counterfactual dependence of effect upon cause. manifest physical 
causes, of course, also show counterfactual dependency, but the difference 
is that in their case the counterfactuals are grounded in properties of the 
manifest physical world.
Wim de muijnck (2003) and ned hall (2004) acknowledge the differences 
between the dependence and production accounts of causation and believe 
that they mark an unavoidable duality in our concept of causality (de 
muijnck 2003, pp. 41-50). each of these authors independently claims that 
we need both concepts because there are some imaginable causal scenarios, 
such as pre-emptions, which resist analysis in terms of counterfactuals, 
and others, such as instances of causation by omission, that resist analysis 
in terms of production; thus, it is claimed, neither can provide a univocal 
account.
the biggest barrier to acceptance of the productive account has been the 
problems of causation by omission (or disconnection) and causation of 
omission (or prevention). For example, schaffer argues that “causation by 
disconnection is causation full force” (schaffer 2000, p. 289). the production 
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the latter “involves no persistence line between disconnector and effect, 
but rather the severing of one” (ivi, p. 291). the hallmarks of productive 
causation, intrinsicality and spatio-temporal connection, are absent. 
schaffer points out, for example, that when a victim is shot through the 
heart, the cause of death is prevention of oxygen from reaching the brain.
i would argue, however, that this merely seems to be a case of causation by 
disconnection. the example is a contextual and interest-bound description 
of manifest physical events, framed so as to meet our explanatory needs. if 
we analyze the process, not as a death by shooting, but at a lower, or simpler, 
level of description – if, that is, we bracket our natural tendency to think 
of the life-death contrast as the all-important explanandum, we find we 
can describe the process in terms of changes in intracellular metabolism 
without alluding to disconnections or omissions at all. i claim that all 
instances of manifest physical causation are capable of description purely in 
productive terms.
the reason references to phenomena like omissions and preventions feature 
in descriptions of manifest physical causal systems is that when those 
systems’ physical parts are arranged in suitable ways they constitute causal 
mechanisms. Glennan defines a mechanism as “a set of systems or processes 
that produce phenomena in virtue of the arrangement and interaction 
of a number of parts” (glennan 2009, p. 315) and goes on, “discovering a 
mechanism is the gold standard for establishing and explaining causal 
connections” (ibidem). there seems to be increasing recognition that the 
study of mechanisms, rather than discovery of laws, is an appropriate 
line of inquiry for the philosophy of the special physical sciences. craver 
and bechtel (2007) give an account of mechanisms in neurophysiology 
that emphasizes the contrast between intralevel causation and interlevel 
constitution. although their notion of constitution is not baker’s technical 
one, there are clear parallels; the suitable arrangement of parts might be 
said to be the favourable circumstances whereby an aggregate of parts 
constitutes a mechanism.
i claim, then, that manifest physical causation is norm-free, causally 
closed, productive, intrinsic, and involves the operation of mechanisms. in 
contrast, an id causal relation such as Jones’s voting making smith angry 
is neither norm-free, productive, intrinsic, or mechanistic in anything like 
the same sense, and in light of this it seems that Jones’s voting, as a higher, 
constituted, and ex hypothesi independent causal power, has no place in the 
manifest physical causal nexus.
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Baker’s argument, above, for the independent causal efficacy of constituted, 
id property-instances, appears valid, but depends on acceptance, on the 
basis of reasons that are external to the argument, of the premise that 
Jones’s voting, v, is indeed the cause of smith’s anger, v*. yet i think many 
would agree that the validity of this premise is just what is at issue. can the 
argument itself establish its validity?
baker claims that v’s causing v* is independent in the sense that it does not 
depend on any lower-level causal process. but such a process undoubtedly 
exists; Jones’s hand-raising, P, causes light rays to travel to smith’s retinae, 
whence neural events are initiated that lead to the instantiation of smith’s 
neural state, P*. call this causal chain or mechanism P&ae’s causing P* (ae 
for additional events). a causal relation between v and v*, however, cannot 
be inferred from P&ae’s causing P*; nothing at the id level corresponds to 
the manifest physical, mechanistic causal chain component “ae”. and on the 
constitution account, the instantiation of P*, caused by P&ae, guarantees, 
in favourable circumstances, that of v*, so that, from the perspective of the 
argument, there seems to be no need for v to cause v*.
Further, ex hypothesi, Jones’s hand-raising, P, and his voting, v, are both 
physical property-instances. so v’s independent, irreducible power of 
causing v* must be a physical causal power. but in the constitution sense, 
v is P – it is just P in the presence of certain relational properties, which, 
according to the account, confer on it extra physical causal powers. if the 
account of manifest physical causation i have given is correct, baker’s 
account leaves the nature and origin of these new physical powers, and how 
they could be efficacious in the same causal nexus as the lower-level powers, 
quite mysterious.
I conclude that Baker’s version of higher causal efficacy cannot work. 
her insistence that id property-instances are physical, and hence that id 
causation is of the same basic kind as lower-level causation, obscures deep 
differences between the two. baker’s claim that all property-instances 
are physical seems to be based upon the assumption that the constitution 
relation of unity without identity dictates that constituted entities be of the 
same general kind as their constituters (baker 2007, p. 161). i think, however, 
that the relational qualities that id property-instances acquire via the 
favourable circumstances of their constitution are such that to insist that 
these instances are physical, despite their lacking the marks of manifest 
physicality and causality that I have identified, is just to deprive the term 
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nevertheless, i agree with the commonsense view that, say, Jones’s voting 
does indeed cause smith’s anger. a way of protecting our ordinary intuitions 
about id causation, i propose, is to claim that not just id causes and effects, 
but the causal relations between them, are constituted by manifest physical 
causal relations in favourable circumstances. thus, on this proposal, the 
causal relation P&ae’s causing P*, in the presence of circumstances that 
are essentially the same as those favouring the constitutions of v and v*, 
constitutes the causal relation v’s causing v*. the former relation just is the 
latter in the constitution sense of “is”, but it is transformed, in the presence 
of its personal and cultural relational milieu, from a mere manifest physical 
relation into a vastly enriched, multi-faceted id causal relation. Further, in 
line with baker’s constitutional claims and our intuitions, the id relation 
subsumes the physical one, thus vindicating our claim that it is the real 
causal relation.
id causation, on this account, belongs in a quite different causal nexus from 
manifest physical causation, a nexus whose operations are constrained, 
not by the laws governing energy transfer or physical mechanisms, but by 
such factors as inference, justification, purpose, and desire. ID and manifest 
physical causes do not interact directly. causation is a diachronic, purely 
intralevel relation, while the physical and id levels are connected through 
the synchronic relation of constitution. 
this allows an alternative to baker’s (2013, pp. 220-233) interpretation 
of an empirical study (anon. 2000) which found a correlation between 
hippocampal size and navigation experience in london taxi drivers. baker 
claims that the study shows that downward causation occurs between 
learning, an id property, and these physical, hippocampal changes. on my 
account, however, learning is constituted by other neural changes which 
cause the hippocampal effects, and this causal relation constitutes a purely 
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